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 This thesis is an investigation into the narrative structures and content of twenty-first-
century populist leaders in the European Union (EU) and the United States. The volume of 
research on populism today appears to be at an all-time high as globalization becomes more 
ubiquitous and peaceful international relations are on thin ice. The goal of this research is to use 
case studies of populist leaders’ speeches compared against one another to identify trends, 
anomalies, and impacts in reference to definitions commonly accepted by the academic 
community and the media. The case studies have been chosen from current politicians 
considered populists by leading researchers in the field, such as Cas Mudde. I am interested in 
the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán; Marine Le Pen of France; Geert Wilders of the 
Netherlands; the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and Senator Bernie Sanders of 
the United States. These case studies will be analyzed in an effort to understand the variance of 
populism across Europe and across the Atlantic with an actor, the US, that has historically been 
an influential political and economic ally and, at times, adversary of the EU since its inception in 
the 1950s. For the sake of comparison, this research also includes a case study of Taoiseach Leo 
Varadker of Ireland, an EU member state that, interestingly, has not experienced the pulls of 
populism as have become manifest elsewhere in the EU. Scholarly consensus is that populism is 
indeed a very “thin” ideology and while it has common overarching themes in the 21st century, 
its inherently paradoxical nature allows for an irrefutable degree of variance within. 
Additionally, its degree of success and the traction it does or does not gain in a political system is 
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CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH PROPOSAL 
If we want to try to begin understanding the state of contemporary populism, we must be 
aware that there is no exact way to define it, nor to characterize those who latch their ideologies 
to it. We can work towards understanding the characteristics that develop around this cultural 
phenomenon so that we can better identify the dynamics surrounding those individuals with a 
populist agenda who emerge in national politics today. Populists organize their rhetoric around a 
concept of “the people” that emphasizes inclusiveness, while setting clear boundaries of just who 
those people are, and against whom in the establishment they need to be fighting in order to be 
heard.  
While populism maintains just a few guiding characteristics, it manifests in different 
ways. For the purpose of this research, I would like to focus on two major regions of the world 
where populism is seemingly growing in tandem with one another: The United States and 
Europe. By taking a transatlantic approach, I aim to investigate the nuances of modern-day 
populism and how the often very similar challenges faced across both regions of the world are 
approached in a variety of different ways by populist leaders. To achieve this, I plan to do a case 
study on three populists in Europe and cross-analyze the narratives they have built for their 
campaigns in order to find where European populism converges and diverges within itself. 
Beyond that though, I plan to look at contemporary populism on a larger, transatlantic scale, by 
then analyzing the rhetoric of self-proclaimed American populist leaders, currently President 
Donald Trump and Senator Bernie Sanders and find the areas where they agree and disagree 
from what is found in the multi-European perspectives.  
For my European case studies, I plan to compare and contrast the rhetoric encapsulated 




Marine Le Pen of France. I ultimately chose to analyze these politicians because they all 
represent the right-wing demographic of their respective countries and utilize similar platforms; 
they do so in ways that resonate amongst different stakeholders, different populations, different 
nationalities and geopolitical positions, with different sensitivities to perhaps the same problems. 
These countries have exceptionally different pasts, yet still have come under the influence of 
populism in very similar ways, and I would like to dissect the narratives that have been utilized 
and find how they fit into, or fall apart, in comparison to the way theorists such as Cas Mudde / 
Rovira Kaltwasser and Jan Werner Müller have depicted populism to exist in the twenty-first 
century.  
I have chosen to analyze Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders as my US case studies in the 
same way. Though representing the same country, their rhetoric and calls to “the people” conflict 
with each other on a number of issues. By cross analyzing the rhetoric of American populists 
from both ends of the political spectrum with European populists, I aim to also find the areas of 
convergence and divergence on a set of social, economic, and security related issues that concern 
both the US and in Europe at the moment. In including Sanders and Trump within this 
conversation, it should be understood that they are very different in the types of populist 
characteristics they take on. Calling both, Sanders especially, “populists” is something that 
scholars are critical of, and I take this into account for this research.  
Case study data will be analyzed qualitatively, and will consist of the transcripts of 
speeches, interviews, and written statements from each individual and will be used in 





CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCTION & LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1: INTRODUCTION 
 What is populism? This is a question that is asked more and more frequently as the 
populist phenomenon has swept over states, regions, and whole continents in recent years. 
Today’s populism is closely associated with radical-right parties in Europe (Mudde, 2004) that 
have been making their discontented voices heard in the aftermath of what is called ‘the migrant 
crisis’ (ca. 2015) and the absorption of millions of migrants from the war-torn countries of the 
Middle East (European Commission, 2016). Despite that though, there has also been a 
resurgence of populism of the left, predominantly seen in Latin American countries like 
Venezuala, and the United States (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). While the term “populism” has 
become somewhat of a buzzword nowadays, there is no denying the prevalence of it becoming 
intertwined with national and international politics today and influencing the state of the global 
order. While populism has been attributed to politicians across Europe, the United States, 
Southeast Asia, and Australasia (2017), the scope of my research is limited to analyzing 
populism and the populist narratives constructed by select individual politicians within the 
United States and Europe, as to construct a pan-European and transatlantic perspective on this 
topic. 
 The United States and the European Union (EU) are each other’s’ closest allies (Smith & 
Steffenson, 2017), though developments and changes over the past three years have put certain 
strains on the EU-US relationship, as President Donald Trump does not believe that the 
preservation of the European Union is of strategic importance for US Foreign Policy (Brattberg 
& Whineray, 2020; Krastev, 2017). The transatlantic relationship brings together their economies 




culture, and normative values, such as democracy, human rights, and rule of law in common 
(2017). Given that these two political entities are already so influential for each other because of 
this “special relationship”, that has formed out of their strategic partnership, can the influence of 
populism perhaps work in the same or similar ways? The first signs of the U. S.’s populist 
resurgence in the twenty-first century came around the US presidential election of 2008 with the 
vice-presidential candidacy of Sarah Palin who exhibited the characteristics of a strong female 
populist leader (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Most recently and more relevantly, though, the 
campaigns for the 2016 election, that included candidates such as Donald Trump and Bernie 
Sanders, have been generally acknowledged as right-wing and left-wing populists, and at the 
same time they were acknowledged as radicals within the Republican and Democratic parties 
respectively. Similarly, and around the same time (if not earlier), twenty-first century populism, 
particularly right-wing populism, found its way into EU member states in countries like 
Hungary, France, and the Netherlands. Though in the past populism has only experienced short-
lived successes (Judis, 2016), something appears to be different in this new era. Donald Trump 
won the 2016 presidential election, and populists are either in power already in Europe or present 
as major and sometimes majority parties, in parliamentary positions, and they also made gains on 
the EU level in the recent European Parliament elections of 2019 (European Parliament, 2019). 
 Scholars have delved into research of historical and contemporary populism and the 
causes for their emergence in politics. The purpose of my research, though, is to take the 
generally respected scholarship of researchers such as Cas Mudde / Rovira Kaltwasser and Jan 
Werner Müller one step further and apply their theories to the narratives of prominent populist 
leaders today from across Europe and the US  It is no secret that politicians use the power of 




numbers and instead scrutinize their words more deeply, we will be able to draw conclusions 
about how populism truly exists today and the way it, or they, as populist politicians influence 
and impact their countries, regions, and international peers. 
While these scholars have generally accepted that there is no one true binding definition 
for populism (even though they do offer general definitions within their texts anyway), for the 
purposes of this research, I will use a “working definition” created in collaboration. This working 
definition will help me navigate the comparison of the European narratives with one another, as 
well as with the American narratives. In today’s political culture it can be difficult for the general 
population to understand exactly what is meant when a political party or particular politician is 
labeled as “populist”. So how are we supposed to understand something in this context that is not 
a political ideology and that can span across the political spectrum? From observations of 
populist parties throughout history to today, there are several key characteristics that we can 
ascribe to populist parties of all types. 
Working definition 
Isolated populism, as I interpret it from various scholars and researchers, is a type of political 
modality, or way of political thinking, that has five main characteristics: 
(1) argues for the inclusiveness of the “true” people 
(2) does not outright reject, but criticizes the establishment 
(3) is anti-elitist (in whatever form that elite may be perceived with differences from region 
to region)  




(5) challenges the liberal democratic order by rejecting plurality and minority rights 
 For the purposes of this research, I further utilize a definition that understands “liberal 
democracy” as a form of political order that protects and promotes majority rule, rule of law, 
plurality, and minority rights (Mueller 2016; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017) as just some of its key 
components. This working definition is not given to wrap populism in a neat box and supersede 
the definitions and published works of the scholars in this field. On the contrary, it will be 
utilized throughout my research project as a sort of qualitative constant to examine and 
experiment with just how similar and/or different populism manifests in the US and the in states 
within European Union.  
2.2: LITERATURE REVIEW ON POPULISM 
The resurgence of populism in the twenty-first century has been followed by extensive 
scholarly input on this phenomenon as we see it sweeping the world today. And while populism 
had its roots in late nineteenth-century America and Europe, the inherent “thinness” of this idea 
has shaped and reshaped the term over time, leaving scholars still trying to answer the seemingly 
simple question, “What is populism?” even today. In fact, many scholars from differing 
academic disciplines like political science, economics, and sociology have tried to tackle this 
political and cultural behemoth that is creating great shake-ups on both extremes of the political 
spectrum.  
Grasping populism as a political phenomenon is complex, in one respect, because the 
current state of global politics. Since the end of World War II, there has been significant 
restructuring of the global order, particularly from the perspective of the “western” world (i.e., 




in the 1950s, and the enlargements, restructuring and liberalizing of the international economic 
system, globalization, and the ever-changing state of international relations that followed it have 
put considerable stress on domestic politics. The combined supply and demand in contemporary 
societies have created a wave of populist leaders and parties, whose narratives can and are being 
shared across national borders and intercontinental oceans in a matter of seconds through modern 
technology and media. I propose questions, though, that ask, how unique these narratives are 
from politician to politician, or country to country, and to what degree they agree and disagree 
with the available scholarship. Populism research has naturally followed closely along with 
populism as a phenomenon within contemporary politics. Several scholars have emerged at the 
forefront of populist literature. The works of Cas Mudde and peers in the field, like Jan Werner 
Müller, John B. Judis, and Chantal Mouffe have contributed significantly to this research area 
and adjacent research, and I will use them to shape the arguments in this project.  
Populism today exists in societal contexts that are very different from those that shaped 
its origins. For both Europe and the US, populism first came to be in the late nineteenth century, 
born out of agrarian groups that would, in the US for example, become the People’s Party(ies) 
that challenged mainstream political parties to appeal to and represent the “true” people (Judis, 
2017). While it took a stronger hold in the US than in Europe in the twentieth century (where no 
evidence of populism existed in the post-War periods), both experienced short-term waves of 
movements that never truly caught on until the end of the 20th century and currently in the 21st 
(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).  
The research Cas Mudde has developed on populism gives very well-rounded and 
comprehensive analyses of the phenomenon. From his collaboration with Cristobal Rovira 




writings have presented the information of how and why and under what conditions populism is 
able to thrive in political systems all over the world. From Mudde’s perspective, here is what we 
know and what scholarship accepts about populism today. Mudde acknowledges how 
generalized the term is, citing it as one of the main problems of identifying populism as 
something that is definable. The core, though, of populism as we understand it today is summed 
up in this definition 
Populism: “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into 
two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the true  people’ versus ‘the elite’, and which argues 
that politics should be an expression of the volonté generale [general will] of the people” (2017). 
At its very basis, this definition describes populism, of course. However, this definition can be 
modified to include several other factors that pertain not to populism generally, but as it exists 
today and take into consideration the twenty-first-century variables that caused it to reemerge. 
Mudde & Kaltwasser use this definition to simply introduce populism to a broad audience, and 
as such, it does its job in formulating the concept’s fundamentals.  
 In 2016, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said on Victory Day to his opposition, 
“We are the people. Who are you?” (Müller, 2016). This quote makes a clear point about the 
concept of “us versus them” within a society. There exists a paradox of inclusivity that passively 
creates a second group of “others”, to be distinguished from an explicitly identified group of “the 
people”. This, I argue, takes Mudde’s definition one step further in identifying the broad 
relationship between the people, the elite, and the outsider today and thus, is a criterion in my 
working definition. In the context of populism today, that outsider is most often the immigrant. 
With the waves of immigrants and refugees seeking asylum within European and US borders, 




 Populism cannot get off the ground without reason to mobilize. Right now, for example, 
in the context of looking at governments that are under populist influence and in at-risk 
democracies, it is beneficial to take a step back and look at the culture of politics in which 
populism has been found to be active. The determining factors for populism’s success, according 
to Mudde & Kaltwasser, divide into three categories: personalist leadership, social movements, 
and political parties (2017). This categorization basically shows that a populist movement can 
have its roots from a top-down approach, a bottom-up “grassroots” approach, or a combination 
of the two. Success from any of these approaches, though, is dependent on the leader that 
becomes the face and voice of “the true people”. That leader can take on a variety of shapes, 
such as “the entrepreneur”, and “the strong(wo)man” (2017), both examples of leaders chosen 
for the case studies in my research. 
 Focusing on the voices and narratives of populism is vital to the research I will set forth. 
There is a great deal of weight placed on the “say” of the populist leaders – for they are the ones 
promising change for the people. Jan-Werner Müller, takes on the “say” versus “do” aspect of 
these leaders, thus kick-starting the conversation to analyze the rhetoric of populists more 
closely. Concisely, what Müller extracts from populist politicians in comparison to regular 
politicians in their speech is the aspect of the competition of morals. He states, “Populists, by 
contrast [in comparison to non-populists], will persist with their representative claim no matter 
what; because their claim is of a moral and symbolic – not empirical – nature; it cannot be 
disproven” (Müller, 2017). There is little reliance on facts and figures for populists, but instead 
the emphasis on the true people and the opposition to their success in society (by the elite). He 





Part of the populist rhetoric, as Müller explains, is rooted in its opposition against 
existing power structures, or “the establishment” that tries to “undermine [these structures’] 
claim to exclusive moral representation” (2017). Thus, this factor, the opposition against existing 
structures, in an exemplary way demonstrated by Viktor Orbán ’s party, has been included in the 
working definition for this research. The concept of the malevolent establishment, much like the 
inclusivity paradox, is a bit ironic. The populist leader/party uses their narratives to build their 
identity as a party of and for the people, that opposes the power structures in place. However, if 
and when they come to power in the form of a national majority, they themselves quickly replace 
and renew the establishment itself.  Here too we find a paradox.   
 From the criteria presented in the working definition, most gather truly from the 
fundamentals of populism as populist scholars have analyzed them. The concept of embracing 
anti-globalism though, may be a bit less evident and needs to be elaborated on. George Monbiot 
introduces the concept of “epidemic loneliness”, alienation, and abandonment sweeping over the 
world not on an individual level, but as a societal phenomenon (Monbiot, 2017). One of the 
causes of this, Monbiot argues, is globalization. Globalization has taken away the power of the 
local economies and has produced a world economy where competition is the only option for 
success. This perpetuates the inequal wealth distribution and the inherent “loss” or silencing of 
those (“the people”) that cannot compete within globalized or globalizing economies (2017). 
Though Monbiot does not make the direct connection to populism, he is of the opinion that the 
remedy to this economic alienation is rebuilding communities from the ground up that “[…] 
restore our sense of belonging” (2017). And in a more abstract and reduced form, that forms part 
of the populist narrative: taking back what belongs to the people. Being an anti-globalist 




and not embrace globalization. This effort, therefore, aims – or claims – to champion the efforts 
and struggles of the working class, the “true people” of a nation, placing emphasis on the fact 
that a populist politician is, indeed, working on behalf of the them and not others.  
Today, scholars recognize that the major theme through which populists operationalize 
anti-globalist sentiments is the heavy-handed rhetoric, mainly from the right-wing, of anti-
immigration policies (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This not only marks their anti-globalism, but 
also potentially codifies one difference between right and left-wing populists. According to John 
B. Judis of The Populist Explosion, a key difference between the left and right is in the “us 
versus them” ideal and who are meant by that. Judis argues that left-wing populists are dyadic in 
the sense that they simply differentiate between “the people” versus “the elite”, while right-wing 
populists are instead triadic, where beyond the basic “us versus them” of the left, there is also 
another “them”, that is “coddled” by the elite- such as immigrants (Judis, 2016). With this 
differentiation by Judis in mind as an umbrella over these two, further research and awareness of 
the vast differentiations that exist in this realm are needed. For example, there is certainly the 
phenomenon of left-wing anti-immigrant voices as well, as seen in the Social Democratic Party 
of Denmark, that, in fact, just won a major election this past year in June of 2019 (Elabdi, 2019).  
Political philosopher from Belgium, Chantal Mouffe, provides a more nuanced 
understanding and definition of left-wing populism in her book published in 2019, For a Left 
Populism. Mouffe identifies, through examples, where the beginnings of left populism have 
arisen in Europe, what its objectives are, and what makes it different from right-wing populism. 
While Judis offers a simple introduction as to how left-wing populism manifests, Mouffe dives 
deeper into the conversation. After the global market crashes of 2008, which heavily impacted 




emergence of this type of party came from Greece and Spain. These political movements, like 
Syriza, she says, are “political movements implementing a form of populism aimed at the 
recovery and deepening of democracy” (Mouffe, 2018). Since 2008, parties resembling that of 
Syrzia in Greece and Podemos of Spain have emerged across Europe, like Germany’s Die Linke, 
and Britain’s Labour Party, under Jeremy Corbyn (2018). However, something that particularly 
resonates with this research is how Mouffe frames the usage of language, or how these left 
populist / social democrat parties should be using language that reframes the right-wing’s 
language that attracts “the people” in order to follow the populist politician. She says the left 
populists should approach the political arena with a different vocabulary that can offer something 
to voters who have egalitarian demands (2018). Mouffe uses the example of the right populists’ 
current usage of xenophobic language to express ideas of representation of the “true people”. 
Instead of this, the left should instead use different vocabulary, she says, “directed toward 
another adversary” in order to satisfy the same demands, but in different ways (2018). 
Understanding left-wing populism, though, is more difficult because there has not been an 
incredible amount of success in the implementation of this strategy in either Europe or the 
United States (although the past popularity of Jeremy Corbyn offers an example of where the left 
was successful in gaining voters from the extreme right in the UK).  
The relationship between populism and democracy, too, is complex. Though, according 
to Mudde & Kaltwasser, that of populism and liberal democracy adds more complexity to the 
relationship because it is understood that they are “at odds” with one another (Mudde & 
Kaltwasser 2017). Liberal democracy is separate from democracy itself because it is regarded as 
a type of political regime that is meant to protect fundamental rights of minorities from a 




unaligned with each other within the context of populism because of its rejection of pluralism, 
and thus, the protection of minority rights (2017). Mouffe contributes to the conversation by 
saying, that conflict is by nature, very important to the concept of democracy and that, “by its 
very definition, a democracy is conflictual. The demos is divided, and there’s always one part of 
the demos that has kratos or power over the other part” (Mouffe, 2019). Müller follows up on 
this reality for populism in spelling out the idea then, of illiberal democracies as “democracies” 
that take away fundamental rights such as civil liberties and minority rights. This contested 
relationship then, has been included within the working definition to acknowledge that populism 
self-perpetuates the challenge toward liberal democratic institutions. 
What is certain from the review of literature on existing populism research, is that we are 
not dealing with a simply manageable phenomenon today. With factors like globalization, 
economic and migrant/ refugee crises changing the causes of populism from what they have been 
in the past, we have to struggle a bit more to find out what we want to know about it and how we 
are able to create connections around it.  
2.3: LITERATURE REVIEW ON RHETORIC AND NARRATIVE 
The way we interact with populism today is very different from even twenty years ago. A 
politician’s words are like ammunition. The way a politician speaks, the phrasing and verbiage, 
the audience, and the message are all factors in the success, or influence, that politician has. 
Today, we are so easily exposed to the types of populist messages shared by political parties and 
politicians via online news sources, television, and social media. It is easier than ever for 
populists to spread their messages far and wide and with frequency enabled to us via platforms 




about contemporary populism itself, but more specifically, about the construction of the 
narratives of populist leaders today.  
 As Mudde & Kaltwasser make clear, populism at its core separates “the true people” 
from “the elite”. Populist leaders, therefore, must construct their various narratives, like 
speeches, social media posts, manifestos, etcetera, with a goal to influence their intended 
audiences and potential constituencies and certain types of legislation within their countries or 
regions. A narratological approach to researching populism today is a way to methodologically 
find out the true power of words and the implications they can have on the outcomes of elections 
and even national and supranational policies (of the European Union, in this case).  
 The clear definition of groups for populism (the leader, the people, and the elite, and/or 
the “other”) makes it relevant for us to look towards the words themselves in a narrative, such as 
the intent and targets of personal pronouns such as “I” and “you” and “we” and “them” as well as 
to whom these words specifically are being directed. Calling upon experts on all narrative, not 
necessarily political narrative, helps lay the corresponding groundwork to this take on populism 
research. The role of the narrator, or politician, him- or herself is central to the argument. These 
narratives in particular aim to build a rapport, or a trust, between the narrator and the intended, or 
the ideal, even, narratee (Genette et al., 1980). The effects of a public narrative in a political 
framework can be boundless and have many implications, thus the work of a politician’s speech 
writer is critical to a campaign during an election year, for example, or in times of crisis like that 
of the European immigration ‘crisis’ that surged in 2015.  
 The foundations of a narrative and its purposes are crucial to what the populist politician 
tries to accomplish. We gather from the works of scholars on populism that the components the 




emotions (typically of anger and discontent with a flurry of issues, people, institutions, etc. …). 
This includes the construction of the “other” and persuading a society, or at least their 
constituents, that there is indeed an “other” that should be demonized and made into a threat to 
their way of life. Construction of the “other” is just one example of the many techniques used by 
populists to persuade.  
 The study of rhetoric is incredibly long and rich with information. Into the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, though, focus has been placed on the boundary between what constitutes 
just rhetoric or narrative on the one hand and what is propaganda on the other. While research for 
this project in particular does not ask the question specifically on propaganda and the populist 
narrative in the twenty-first century, there are elements in the following discussion that focus on 
rhetoric framed as propaganda – when discussing the elements of a political narrative, it is 
sometimes difficult not to equate the two. In my research, rather, I am more interested in the 
message that is being delivered and in picking apart the construction of that message, and its 
desired effect on “the people”. This endeavor leads us back to the great ancient Greek 
philosophers like Socrates and Aristotle and their basic ethics of rhetoric. Aristotle, who created 
the ideas of logos, pathos, and ethos as modes of persuasion, said thought that “rhetoric is both 
useful and necessary for political discourse. […] Its first and only requirement that it be effective 
for a particular audience” (Soules, 2015). 
 When we narrow down the concept of rhetoric and direct it toward the object of this 
research, we arrive at narrative. The term “narrative” is rather broad for what it encompasses. 
Aristotle defines it as “the imitation of action, a fabrication involving something familiar” 
(Soules, 2015). While our minds may be predisposed to categorize narrative as fiction rather than 




the populist is something that embeds its goals in persuading a targeted audience (the people) to 
believe in the carefully crafted stories in order to gain influence. We can attribute so much of the 
key components of what makes a populist’s narrative, their speeches, so powerful to the very 
basics of what Aristotle says creates an effective piece of rhetoric. While it may seem 
reductionist to bring this argument back to basics, that is what my research ultimately wants – 
what lies behind the words of a populist and in looking at multiple case studies, do they all fit 
into a certain mold? Or is populism nuanced beyond the point of having unifying definers and 
markers?  
2.4: THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN INTERNATIONALLY INFLUENTIAL ACTOR 
AND THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP 
 This research focuses on understanding the European Union itself as a normative power, 
rather than focusing on it as an economic entity, as it is very often characterized. There has been 
a fair amount of research that strives to understand how we should frame the EU in political 
terms today. There has been nothing like the EU as a supranational power. Its presence as an 
international foreign policy actor is undeniable. In terms of its economic power, for example, it 
has created a system of bilateral trade deals between individual countries. As a normative power, 
the EU is literally understood as an institution that has the power to create, market, and export its 
values and ideologies; it is also being described as “power over opinion” (Manners, 2002).  
 While the EU itself, in terms of its executive bodies, like the Commission or the Council, 
are resisting the tenants of populism itself, its members states indeed are vulnerable to populist 
voices. As a normative power, the EU has established several ‘core’ norms that have been built 
up over time.   These are a reflection and summarization of the acquis communitaire and are 




liberty, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights (2002). To understand how the EU 
itself deals with its member states and the own national governance of these states, it is crucial to 
see that these must always refer to these European norms and that the EU ensures that every 
member state adheres to them. These norms, as Manners lists them, are vital for accession to the 
European Union itself and are a key component of the Copenhagen criteria. According to a 
subset of political criteria, a country looking to join the EU must have “stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities” in addition to fulfilling specific economic and other institutional criteria (EUR-Lex, 
2020).  






It is important to acknowledge at this juncture that not all the individuals in this case 
study are currently in power in their countries. Of the populist politicians I have chosen, only 2 
are in positions of power as heads of state: Viktor Orbán, as the leader of the Fidesz party, has 
the position of Prime Minister of Hungary, and Donald Trump, President of the United States. As 
can be extracted from Orbán’s speeches, he has been governing his country in a way that rejected 
the norms and political criteria that all EU member states are required to follow. In the wake of 
the refugee crisis, Orbán has slandered minorities, overpowered his courts (Jovanovic, 2020), 
and his regime has taken measures that have made Hungary the glaring example of democratic 
backsliding in Europe. Many scholars have pointed out that there are current member states of 
the EU that would not qualify for membership given these non-economic criteria, especially the 
countries that have not committed to the rights and protection of individuals and minorities, 
whether these are religious, ethnic, or national (Judt, 1996).  
 The core norms held by the European Union are also the tenants of what we understand 
today as liberal democracy. There is no one-size-fits all democratic system that can be prescribed 
to every country that rules under a democratic order. Today, when using the term “democracy”, 
many of us mean a liberal democracy, but not all of us, and that is where the tensions lie, 
especially in this age of populism. Figure 1.0 demonstrates a sliding scale of (liberal) democracy 
and just how populism supposedly fits into that scale. The creators of this scale acknowledge that  
populism can have both positive and negative effects on the democratization process. Ultimately, 
this scale shows that populists exercising power are able to manipulate the democratic process in 
ways that can erode or fortify democracies.  In fact, if the accepted definition of populism is 
thought about in context of a liberal democracy, it comes into direct conflict with it, since it 




Kaltwasser, 2017).  Twenty-first-century populists are often working to erode the liberal 
democratic system. I will expand on this in the section on Hungary and Ireland. 
 In an effort to analyze these populist narratives from a transatlantic perspective as well, 
the importance of the European “voice” or “voices” also needs to be mentioned. While the focus 
of my research is not directly on the EU as an institution itself, as mentioned before when I 
discussed the EU and its relationship to member states as a normative power, emphasis needs to 
be placed on the positioning of the EU as an international actor and the characterization of how it 
speaks. There exist scholarly debates on whether the European Union speaks to other foreign 
actors, such as the United States, as just one voice (from the executive powers in Brussels), or 
with many voices, stemming from all of its institutions and member states (Gjovalin & 
Nicolaïdis, 2014). A key aspect of my argument lies in the consideration that the EU is an entity 
that is able to speak and spread information, ideologies, and political thought with the help of its 
many voices via its member states (more specifically, the leaders of those states), and by means 
of those who represent their political parties within bodies such as the European Council and the 
European Parliament. While the narratives and actions of some of these politicians are not 
expressly reflected on and endorsed by the EU, because the country is a part of the EU itself, its 
power and voice in the world, even if we are dealing with a small country, are amplified because 
of this institutional framework.  
 Many refer to the US and the EU as having a “special relationship” (Smith & Steffenson, 
2017) due to the multifaceted ways in which the two powers are intertwined today. The most 
prominent area of connection between the two powers is economic in nature, so much to the 
point that the EU and US economies are labeled as “intertwined” in many regards. The 




developments of the post-war period and the Cold War. It is no secret that post-World War II, 
the US pushed the adoption of a Western market system in Europe that was “thus paralleled by 
the desire to promote the strengthening of liberal democracies in Europe” (Smith a.o. 2017). This 
period was crucial for the formation of political ideologies and the influence of the United States 
in Europe and for what would become the European Union itself. US influence on and the 
consequent sharing of the democratic ideology was a starting point for the transatlantic 
partnership.  
 There is a history of US export of political values to the EU, but something this research 
attempts to map is the potential influence of the EU politicians back on US politicians and if that 
is something that we are able to pick out from the patterns and content of their narratives. 
Already, considerable research has been done on the capacity of the EU to influence  
international organizations, and the overarching idea is that its ability to participate in them and 
exert influence is linked to the competency area as well as who is speaking for the EU (Smith 
a.o. 2017). This framing of the way the EU operates with all of its member states and core 
institutions is based on the EU’s intergovernmentalism as well as its goals for integration.  
 Intergovernmentalism understands the process of European integration as reliant on the 
cooperation between national governments as opposed to EU institutions themselves (Staab, 
2011). A variant of intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, expands the theory to 
state that “the forces at play in domestic politics to explain the various governments’ behavior in 
the EU” and that the role of member states should not be underestimated as the foundation of the 
EU (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2015). The example commonly used to illustrate this theory is EU 
foreign policy, as there is not one unified policy. Under the guidance of this theory, we are able 




be through formal or informal political avenues. In interacting with Europe as well, the United 
States can choose to “defect from common EU positions, to develop ‘special relationships’ with 
member states” (Smith & Steffenson, 2017). While such actions may undermine the solidarity of 
the EU, it is not necessary an explicitly targeted act by the US, and instead “a reflection of the 


















CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN & CASE STUDIES 
3.1: RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research Questions 
1. What are the major themes of populism in the EU versus the US, and how do they 
compare? 
2. What do populist narratives tell us about the political systems and the transatlantic 
relationship of the US and Europe?  
3. Can populism really be concretely defined? What are the implications if we cannot? 
4. How do these narratives influence public opinion and voting populations since 2015? 
5. How is populism manifesting itself in other European Union countries today? 
6. How effective is the narratological method in researching this topic?  
Hypotheses 
• H1: Using narratology to compare populist rhetoric will show how the guiding 
concepts of populism can manifest themselves in very different ways across the 
political spectrum, national borders, and continents. 
• H2: Populism is still inherently, by its nature, paradoxical and difficult to define, but 
there are constants that can be isolated from narratives that give it a loose binding. 
• H3: The themes within contemporary populism transcend borders and domestic 
politics and are thus influential in political culture between the United States and 
Europe. 
• H4: The influence of populists and the populist narrative are highly contextual and 








The narratives of American and European populist politicians will be dissected using the 
criteria of the working definition. By doing this, I hope to gain perspective on just how 
“populist” these pieces of rhetoric are, as well as provide useful insight into research on 
populism that is otherwise lacking. For the scope and scale of this project, the data collection, 
therefore, will be done qualitatively, with the potential of expanding into qualitative data 
collection in the future, should this project expand. 
The process of choosing the populist politician and their narratives that will be used could 
have taken many different directions. While there is not one perfect strategy, the choice of the 
case study model for this project lends itself for a “most different dystems design”, using a 
number of leaders generally considered populist from Europe, even though European countries 
have very different political histories and cultures in comparison to the US populist parties and 
are placed on different ends of the political spectrum. This is to say though, that while this model 
is not perfect, for the scope of this research, the case studies are not needed to be an exact fit 
within a research design model. Remarkably, we have observed populism to be alive and well on 
both ideological extremes of the political spectrum today: from left-wing democratic socialism, 
to ultra-right-wing nationalism. Thus, case studies were chosen to include narratives 
representative of a diverse range of populists on the right and on the left.  
The decision to include the chapter on narrative effectiveness strays away from the idea 
of dissecting the narrative itself and begins to delve into how we are beginning to see populism 
influence or not influence a nation. This chapter also means to address the fact that there are in 
fact still countries in the European Union that have not been affected in the same way by 




similarities, this section aims to bring to light several key differences that we can correlate to the 
presence or absence of populism and successful populist leaders within a country’s political 
system.  
Case Studies 
1. President Donald Trump (United States – Republican Party) 
2. Senator Bernie Sanders (United States – Democratic Party) 
3. Marine Le Pen (France – National Rally) 
4. Geert Wilders (The Netherlands – Party for Freedom) 
5. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (Hungary – Fidesz) 
For each individual politician, I have selected one speech which I want to analyze with the same 
set of criteria in mind, thus creating a consistent basis for testing. Once each selection has been 
analyzed and the findings have been discussed, I will be able to compare and contrast the 
broken-down narratives from each politician and country and be able to begin drawing 
conclusions for the research questions I set on the outset of this project. 
 Not only is the content of the populist narratives important for the purpose of grasping 
how populism itself exists and thrives today, but through this research I seek to understand the 
reality of the influence of these narratives. Through research on election results and public 
opinion data, I hope to find a connection between the words spoken by the populist leaders and 
their effect on their constituencies. The purpose underlying the speeches of politicians is to 
solidify a voter base and attract new voters for themselves. They put together these persuasive 
and emotive narratives that are presented to millions of people not just within their own country, 




differences in public opinion on a specific topic that dominates the populist rhetoric. Immigration 
is a leading issue in both Europe and the United States today and is an intensely debated topic 
that dominates political agendas. I aim for this part of the research to have several purposes. For 
one, I hope to analyze the influence that a populist narrative can have on voting bodies in 
countries where populism is undeniably present. Furthermore, I want to know why, or at least 
begin to understand why, populism has not been successful in some countries in the EU as it has 
so ferociously in others; for this I will utilize the same kind of narrative analysis format.  
In an effort to take this research a step further in the analysis of the populist narratives, I 
would like to include a case study of an EU country where populism appears not to have taken 
hold with the vigor that it has in other countries (as the ones listed above). I am interested in the 
Republic of Ireland (Hereby referred to as “Ireland”). Despite years of turmoil, societal frictions 
and seemingly favorable conditions for the emergence and influence of a populist party, there is 
not much of note in the twenty-first century that would qualify as populist in Ireland when we 
compare it to other countries in the EU.  
Therefore, Ireland will serve as somewhat of a different case study that will be compared 
with the countries listed above that serve as the populist case studies of EU countries. I want to 
know what conditions have set Ireland apart from these countries, specifically focusing on the 
rhetoric of the current Taoiseach, or Prime Minister, Leo Varadkar, and taking into account, 
historically, how Ireland has been affected by and reacted to crises such as the European refugee 
‘crisis’ of 2015 (which served to fuel the populist narratives of the other states). There is not an 








indicates that existing populism in Ireland is situated on the left of the political spectrum (Sinn 
Fein) and varies from the popularly accepted characteristics of populists today (Suiter, 2017).  
3.2: DONALD TRUMP (UNITED STATES) 
 President Donald Trump, elected in the 2016 US Presidential election, is one of the 
country’s first generally acknowledged populists in the twenty-first century. He built his 
campaign for the Republican Party on a platform that called to bring jobs back to the United 
States and fix the immigration system with his infamous wall on the US-Mexico border. He won 
the 2016 election by gaining the votes of working-class voters of America (Tyson & Maniam, 
2016). Trump, throughout his four-year term, has continued to reach out to his constituents, for 
instance in the manufacturing regions of the US, like Lima, Ohio.  On March 20th, 2019, 
President Trump visited the Lima Army Tank Plant and delivered remarks to the plant’s workers 
and local politicians regarding saving and the expansion of the factory’s manufacturing 
capabilities. I read the transcript from this speech with the criteria from the working definition of 
populism in mind to analyze this text. 
Inclusivity paradox: The trademark of populist behavior is using an inherently inclusive 
rhetoric that reaches das wahre Volk (Müller, 2016) or the true people, of a nation. This is often 
achieved by the utilization of the pronoun “we” when speaking publicly. Trump utilizes the “we” 
within these remarks in a way that refers more often to his presidential administration than to his 
audience of American factory affiliates and Ohio politicians. In his speech, aimed at detailing 
national security, he says “We took over a mess. We took over a mess with North Korea. We 
took over a mess in the Middle East. We took over. […] It was going to go bad, and then we 
opened up with the regulation cuts and all of the other things we’ve done, including the big tax 




took over from the Obama administration. This use of “we” is contrasted with the use of “you” to 
refer to those that are in the audience – this pronoun is used throughout his remarks. He says 
“What you’re doing has been more incredible. You stuck it out and now you’ve got one of the 
most successful military plants in the world” (2019).  
 The we/you separation in this context demonstrates that Donald Trump does not precisely 
fit into the standard model for building a rhetoric of inclusivity with the vehicle of select pronoun 
usage. There’s a particular passage, however, in which Trump breaks from this formula and 
demonstrates almost perfectly a paradox of inclusivity when he says, “But nobody has done the 
job that we’ve done. And I say ‘we’ because you’ve been on our side. Your union leaders aren’t 
on my side, by the way […] But the unions – the people that work there are on our side […] Nice 
guys, but they’re democrats no matter what” (2019). The American bipartisan political system 
creates an obvious “other” for republicans with the democrats functioning as this other. Trump’s 
usage of “we” and “our” here, is meant to include the Trump administration and his audience in 
Ohio together, but is very blatantly exclusionary of democrats and union leaders (of whom he 
claims that they are all democrats).   
On the establishment: President Trump started out his speech with remarks that, presumably, 
were positioned to slight the preceding US presidential administration. While not directly calling 
it by name, Trump uses “they” as his means of referring to his predecessors. As an opening 
statement, Trump declares to a cheering crowd, “Well, you better love me; I kept this place open, 
that I can tell you. (Applause) They said, ‘We’re closing it.’ And I said, ‘No, we’re not.’” (2019). 
While not only using a language of othering in the usage of “they”, Trump indicates here that the 
prior establishment in place had tried to implement a decision that would close the factory that he 




to Trump’s clear and public discontent with the operations of the US federal government during 
the Obama administration and the years before, although that information cannot be derived from 
this particular text. He does however, later on in the speech, move to call out President Obama 
directly and say, “Four straight years, the number of US tanks that were budgeted for upgrades 
was zero. Does anybody remember that? Raise your hands. Do you remember that? Zero. That 
was under your great President Obama. Our military readiness declined and your workforce was 
slashed by 60 percent” (2019).  
On the elite: Comments on corruption can be identified quite easily. Trump takes the 
opportunity to make his thoughts known on another opposition group, and his version of the 
“corrupt elite” – the media. He states, “I have the fake news hounding me all the time. […] The 
fake and phony and corrupt. It’s fake. It’s corrupt” (2019). While this remark is not difficult to 
decipher, it is interesting to point out here that he brings up the “corrupt elite” entirely 
unprompted. This speech to the Ohio factory workers was one intended to praise the 
contributions the workers have made towards national security and defense. Not a campaign 
rally, nor a State of the Union address by any means, but he still managed to make the point to let 
his audience know where “corruption” is truly deriving from within the United States. 
On anti-globalism: On the topic of national security and the value of production and 
manufacturing in the US, Trump brings up the US’s global position amongst competitor nations 
for oil production. He says, “Think of that, beating out Saudi Arabia and Russia. They’re pretty 
good producers, right? Guess What? We do more than they do” (2019). He uses more pro-
American rhetoric further on in his speech, with statements such as “Buy American and hire 
American” (2019). Trump fits the model of an anti-globalist in economic terms. Trump makes it 




is what has made the changes for the US economy since his term began. His rhetoric on 
American car manufacturing in the US, along with oil production, and hardline trade deals with 
other countries like China shows how Trump is turning his back on embracing a global society, 
contributing to the discourse on the renewed sense of an isolationist America.  
On liberal democracy: Trump’s actions in relation to the liberal democratic order have proven 
that he clearly challenges the system. The hiring of his own family members as well as the repeal 
of important pieces of minority legislation from previous administrations (such as the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals), shows this, for example. This narrative in particular does not 
give clear indications of his thoughts about a liberal democracy or its components- he does not 
use this term outright. The absence of any mention of minority rights in his speech, therefore, 
shows how Trump, instead of championing minorities, places focus within his narrative 
strategies on rewarding his constituencies. This is an example of the “what politicians say” 
versus “what politicians do” complex and the implications of this will be discussed in the 
analysis.   
3.3: BERNIE SANDERS (UNITED STATES) 
 Senator from Vermont, Bernie Sanders, a self-proclaimed democratic socialist, has been 
associated left-wing populism in the United States, though has been criticized within the 
scholarship as to whether he matches the true identity of a left-wing populist. Left-wing 
populism, as has been noted, is most predominantly associated with the politicians of Latin 
America today (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The presence of a left-wing populist in American 
political culture today, while not unprecedented, is a change from the more prevalent right-wing 
populist narratives seen today, particularly in Europe. Senator Sanders ran for the democratic 




Hillary Clinton. Despite the loss in 2016, Sanders has been in the running for the Democratic 
candidate for the 2020 election, though announced the suspension of his campaign several 
months ahead of the election. Early on at the stages of his announcement to run, he engaged in an 
interview with CBS News to talk about his campaign platforms. 
Inclusivity paradox: For Bernie Sanders, “the people” are quite literally, nearly everyone. First 
born out of the Occupy Wallstreet, the idea of the 99% of the American people versus the 1% of 
Americans that own most of the wealth has become a major theme of the Sanders campaign 
(Judis, 2016). This is the base for many of Sanders’s campaign points. Throughout this 
interview, Senator Sanders makes statements that detail he is trying to be a voice for all those 
who do not have a voice. When asked about the state of wealth concentration in America, he 
says, “You have three people who own more wealth than the bottom half of American society. 
[…] we got veterans sleeping out on the street; we have kids who can’t afford to go to college; 
you got 30 million people who have no health care” (CBS This Morning, 2019). Sanders’s 
people are not just his own constituents, nor simply the middle class. He defines the true 
American people in terms of the wealth distribution in the US and aims to exclude the very few, 
yet very wealthy “morally wrong” (2019) individuals from that group. 
On the establishment & the elite: Bernie makes obvious who are the corrupt elite of the United 
States, from his perspective, within his rhetoric, much like Donald Trump, although their 
definitions differ. In Bernie Sanders’s interview, he answers a question from his interviewer on 
the power of the grassroots movement and says, 
Look John, we are the only major country on Earth not to guarantee health care to all, and 
the reason for that is the power of the insurance companies. We pay by far the highest 
prices in the world for prescription drugs. That's the pa-- power of the pharmaceutical-- 




sums of money. That's the power of the top 1% and the billionaire class, and on and on it 
goes” (2019). 
 
 We can unpack a lot of detail about Sanders’ views from this quote. He clearly criticizes the 
financial establishment and condemns the current political establishment, that, while he 
obviously refers to the current administration under President Trump, could also mean the 
system as it has existed for years, even under past democratic administrations. Therefore, his 
criticism of the establishments goes beyond party lines. 
On anti-globalism: The concept of being an anti-globalist in the context of populism could have 
several implications. While Sanders has been known to approach this ideal from the perspective 
of international trade and the global economy (“Bernie Sanders on the Issues”, 2019), this 
interview brought in his perspective on foreign relations from the perspective of defense. When 
briefly talking on foreign policy and his take on the current engagement of US military troops 
overseas, Sanders said “I—I think—the idea that we are gonna withdraw troops—from—Syria 
or from Afghanistan—is—is the right thing, but it has to be done not through a tweet” (CBS This 
Morning, 2019). While this was Sanders’s only comment made in terms of foreign policy within 
this interview, it is indicative of two points. 1. Sanders maintains an anti-globalist perspective in 
his rhetoric in terms of becoming less engaged in overseas wars. 2. The last comment in the 
quote was directed towards the Twitter-savvy Donald Trump, who has been known to often 
bring calls-to-action via Twitter and was a follow up to the remark that Trump and he actually 
have similar goals when it comes to international engagement – a point of cohesion for the 
opposed populist leaders. 
On liberal democracy: Where Bernie Sanders perhaps departs from the populist leader 




towards the strengthening of social programs for Americans. He detailed this aspect of his 
campaign in the interview, saying  
You will recall—you may recall that in 2016 many of the ideas that I talked about-- 
Medicare for all, raising the minimum wage – to $15 an hour – making public colleges 
and universities tuition free – spending at least $1 trillion and rebuilding our crumbling 
infrastructure—criminal justice reform—all of those ideas people would say, “Oh 
Bernie, they’re so radical” (CBS This Morning, 2019).  
 
Campaigning so clearly for specific programs that build up the concept of liberal democracy 
gives Sanders a side to his narrative that does not quite align with the working definition given 
here for the modern populist. Though, perhaps this points to the differences between left- and -
right wing populism, or even the “thicker” ideology that Sanders attached to his brand of 
populism as a democratic socialist.  
3.4: MARINE LE PEN (FRANCE) 
 Marine Le Pen, daughter of the founder of the ultra-right-wing party, Front Nationale, or 
Rassemblement national, as she has rebranded it, ran for the French Presidency in 2017 versus 
Emmanuel Macron, and she was defeated. Le Pen embodies the “strongwoman” populist leader. 
She gave a campaign speech just several months before the 2017 election in Lyon, France. This 
speech actually kicked off her campaign for the election, meaning that it was aggressive towards 
her opponents, and a loud display of her ideologies (Vinocur, 2017). 
Inclusivity Paradox: In this speech, Le Pen addresses her audience in an inclusive manner, just 
as the narratives discussed thus far have. She uses the pronoun “us” to define who “the people” 
she represents are. While vague, the staunch nationalist gives insight into who the true people of 
France are, saying “From [the election’s] outcome, will depend the continuity of France as a free 




(Rassemblement National, 2017). Ultimately, Le Pen’s inclusivity, as defined through the rest of 
her speech, is contingent on the level of nationalism the people feel for France and the value they 
place on the French identity above all else. She closes her speech by saying 
 “This cleavage no longer opposes the right and the left, but the patriots to the globalists. 
In this presidential election, we represent the camp of the patriots…We urge all patriots 
from right or left to join us. Elected or ordinary citizens, wherever you come from, 
whatever your commitments may have been, you have your place at our side. Patriots, you 
are welcome!” (2017).  
 
While this statement is still very broad on who embodies the “us”, she clearly designates a 
“them” – the globalists of France and of Europe as a whole. The division of “patriots” versus 
“globalists” is a trend now backed by Le Pen and Orbán. The similarities in the content of their 
speeches in terms of narrative strategies determining who are meant to be included and not 
included as members of the “true people” in their respective countries are clearly there. 
On the establishment, the elite, & anti- globalism: Le Pen makes her feelings of opposition 
against all three of these concepts very clear, somehow in one breath. She opens her speech by 
saying, “I say it with gravity: the choice we will have to make in this election is a choice of 
civilization. Our leaders chose deregulated globalization, they wanted it to be a happy thing, it 
turned out awful” (2017). Within this remark alone, she criticizes the policies of France’s 
political establishment (though the use of “our” in this case diverges from the “us versus them” 
ideology between the people and the elite) specifically because of the pro-globalization policies 
that she and the National Rally outright condemn. She moves forward with her remarks on 
globalization, saying  
“Jihadist globalism that undermines our vital interests abroad, but also that is implanted on 




both of them work for the disappearance of our nation, that is, of France in which we live, 
which we love, which is why the French have a feeling of dispossession” (2017).  
 
These anti-globalist sentiments, therefore, are promoted by Le Pen using the rationale of 
preserving the French identity and ridding it of the “Islamic fundamentalism” and 
“financialization” (2017) of the French economy. By this, she refers the attack of globalization 
on the French economy from all sides, essentially, taking the forms of mass immigration “from 
below” and international finance “from above” (Bamat, 2017).  This example takes on Judis’s 
theory of the triadic nature of the right-wing populists: The true French people versus the 
financialized, corrupt elite (that happens to be a part of the establishment) versus the immigrants 
who are bringing the religion and culture of Islam into France. 
 Le Pen also, like Orbán, is a textbook Eurosceptic, as she laments on the failures of the 
EU. She says,  
“By refusing to free themselves [the past/current political establishment in France] from 
the straitjacket of the European Union which is the decisionmaker on these subjects, they 
refrain themselves from any inflection even minor. Worse, staying in the euro, they plague 
our economy, maintain mass unemployment and give the European Union the means of 
pressure to impose its views, its inane directives, its millions of migrants. Everyone agrees, 
the European Union is a failure” (2017) 
 
Therefore, Le Pen’s rhetoric is critical of not just the national political system of France, but also 
the European Union – and specifically, the euro, in this narrative. 
On liberal democracy: The contents of the right-wing narratives, as we have seen thus far are 
hard to analyze when looking for evidence of challenging liberal democracies. However, Le Pen’s 
laments of the supposed dangers of Islam within the French borders gives potential insight to the 




she steps into national power in the future. There is a clear rejection of minority rights within her 
rhetoric, with statements like “The places of Islamic preaching will be closed and the sowers of 
hatred condemned and expelled” (2017). While just one component of what constitutes a liberal 
democracy, this example can easily be extrapolated to other themes that could degrade the country 
into an illiberal democracy, as in Hungary. 
3.5: GEERT WILDERS (THE NETHERLANDS) 
 Geert Wilders, the leader of the Netherlands’ Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom) 
in the Dutch House of Representatives since 2006, has been one of the prominent examples of 
European populism since he began speaking out against the EU and Islam as his main 
campaigning points. Wilders is an interesting example as a European populist, which makes him, 
therefore, an interesting addition to this research. He is an outlier in the sect of right-wing 
populism due to the nature the Dutch’s socially progressive ideals While the right-wing populists 
seen on the international stage today are typically fighting for Christian, heteronormative ideals, 
Wilders has used his more progressive social stances as ammunition within his populist rhetoric. 
While the Dutch and Wilders have strong beliefs in LGBTQ+ rights, Wilders weaves this into his 
Islamophobic rhetoric as a means of saying conservative Muslim refugees would not fit into the 
progressive Dutch society (Damhuis, 2019). The narrative I will be analyzing is a speech he gave 
to the Abrosetti conference in Italy back in 2017. While this speech is not being given to an 
audience of Dutch nationals, instead to the members of the “European establishment” (Kruis, 
2017), Wilders still shares the main themes of his campaign rhetoric without restraint. 
Inclusivity paradox, the elite, and the establishment: Considering Wilders’ two major themes 
in his rhetoric, his narrative portrays “the people” as simply the nationals of any EU country who 




preservation of his perspective on their values, is what “the people” are embracing, as opposed to 
those who support the EU and its interventions in sovereign member states. Wilders states, 
“Unfortunately most of our governments have transferred ever more powers to the EU, 
undermining many important things we Dutch have achieved over the past centuries and hold 
very dear” (2017). What makes Wilders different, however, is that unlike his right-wing 
counterparts in other European countries, he has supported legislation that promotes LGBTQ+ 
rights as well as other socially progressive initiatives that are not otherwise seen amongst more 
conservative right-wing populists. He criticizes the Dutch government for willingly giving the 
powers of the sovereign nation-state away to the even more flawed politicians of the EU. He 
goes on to further refine his version of the elite – pegging the EU bureaucrats as threats to Dutch 
patriots as well as patriots of singular national sovereignties across the EU. 
On anti-globalism: Wilders passionately defends the ideology of nationalism and the concept of 
anti-globalism throughout his speech to the EU affiliates. He states,  
“Our forefathers have fought for a democratic Netherlands. That is a Netherlands where 
the Dutch electorate and nobody else decides on Dutch matters. Democracy means that a 
people can decide its own legislation. Democracy equals home rule. But owing to the 
transfer by our governments of powers to Brussels, the EU institutions and other countries 
are now deciding on issues which are vital to our nation state: our immigration policy, our 
monetary policy, our trade policy and many other issues.” (2017) 
 
Without detailing the Dutch economy and international trade agreements and Dutch job creation 
as in the narratives of Trump and Orbán, Wilders clearly wants total divestment of the 
Netherlands from the EU, at the very least.  
On liberal democracy: Once more, evidence found within this narrative, as with the narratives 
of the other European populists in this research, is that challenges to liberal democracy are based 




society, as well as a Europe all-together, where the EU is allowed to “force upon us the bitter 
fruit of their cosmopolitan immigration policy” (2017). Here, Wilders quoted Viktor Orbán, a 
champion of illiberal democracy, with whom he expressed he shares mirrored sentiments 
regarding a “Europe [of] Christian, free and independent nations” (2017). This is not to say, 
though, that Wilders and Orbán, nor Wilders and Le Pen, are aligned in all of their ideals and 
opinions. As I will show in the coming analysis, these politicians, though populists, nonetheless, 
diverge from one another on several very key social issues that create divisions for European 
populists and show the diversity of populism today.  
3.6: VIKTOR ORBÁN (HUNGARY) 
 Viktor Orbán is perhaps one of the most infamous politicians associated with the right-
wing populist resurgence in Europe. Orbán has been one of the loudest voices, speaking with 
strong nationalist, anti-immigration, and Eurosceptic rhetoric as the leader of an ultra-right-wing 
political party, Fidesz, as well as of the Hungarian state. In 2018, the Prime Minister was elected 
into his fourth term, and he gave an acceptance speech to his fellow Hungarians that I have 
chosen to analyze here. 
Inclusivity Paradox: Prime Minister Orbán opened his address to the Hungarian people just 
after his oath of office with the words, “Thank you to everyone who voted in the election for the 
National Assembly – whichever candidate they voted for. I especially thank those who voted for 
us, the civic, national, and Christian forces” (Visegrad Post, 2018). While addressing all of 
Hungary, Orbán makes a point of identifying “the people” that he truly values as Hungarian 
citizens: his fellow nationalists and Christians. This naturally speaks to Orbán’s nationalist 
ideology. Therefore, he uses his power to speak for the “true Hungarians that are presumed to 




throughout his address. And while he does use “othering” to separate those who do not adhere to 
the values of “true” Hungarians, he still includes them in his welcome, thus illustrating the 
strategic inclusivity paradox. 
On the establishment & the elite: Euroscepticism is one of the defining features of European 
populism today, with Orbán’s voice being one of the loudest amongst the ranks. As a politician 
who is nearly a decade in power in Hungary, he has created his own establishment on the 
national level. Thus, he has moved to criticize the establishment on the supranational level, as his 
right-wing peers from other EU member states tend to do as well. He speaks of the EU quite 
clearly in his address, saying,  
“The European Union must return to reality. As a first step, it must change its thinking on 
migration, mass population movement and immigration. In Brussels nowadays people 
believe that it is unfair if one is not born in the country where one would like to live. They 
believe that it is fair to give people the right to move to wherever they would like to live. 
In Brussels nowadays there are thousands of paid activists, bureaucrats and politicians 
working to have migration declared a fundamental human right. Therefore they want to 
deprive us of the right to decide for ourselves who we let in to the country and who we 
refuse entry to” (2018).  
 
Though still supportive of the EU, Orbán sees one of the fundamental freedoms of the EU, the 
freedom of movement, as a threat to Hungarian sovereignty. He makes a point of distancing 
himself from the EU leadership in Brussel by using the pronoun “they”, as to remind his audience 
that the EU is not a keeper of Hungarian values or interests in this context. Migration has become 
a central issue for European populism and Orbán’s criticism of the EU’s management of 
immigration and asylum seekers is stated loud and clear within his narrative. 
On anti-globalism: Within Orbán’s victory speech, he naturally focuses much of his rhetoric 




his speech, not only in his condemnation of immigration, but also by expanding on this ideal. 
Orbán states, 
“This is why we undertake to halt demographic decline – indeed we will succeed in 
returning Hungary to an upward trend […] At present six hundred multinational companies 
are responsible for 80 percent of world export trade. This is why we must bring investments 
to Hungary which produce high added value and higher wages. In this respect we want to 
be among the ten best countries in the world. Alongside all this, we will increase 
Hungarian-owned companies’ share in exports from Hungary to 50 per cent of the total.” 
(2018) 
 
As part of Orbán’s nationalist rhetoric, he, in this speech, makes a call to his audience that Hungary 
should and will be “among the five best countries in the European Union in which to live and 
work” (2018) and he perceives that goal only achievable if Hungary focuses purely on its domestic, 
as well as regional economy, in order to become a better exporter. What we can gather from this 
excerpt as well, is that the Prime Minister is wanting to instead make globalization work for the 
Hungarian nation and add themselves to the list of powerful players in international markets.  
 This concept does seem a bit paradoxical as well and seems to take on different shapes for 
the Prime Minister. It is not difficult to find cases where Orbán has dismissed globalism outright. 
In a speech given later in 2018, he says “Let us choose independence and the cooperation of nations 
over global governance and supervision. Let us reject the ideology of globalism, and instead 
support the culture of patriotism” (Visegrad Post, 2018). Just based on these excerpts, it is clear 
that, economically speaking, Orbán wants to strengthen the Hungarian economy through their 
manufacturing and exports so that they are able to play the game of economic globalization – a 
game in which they are currently barely even a player. In terms of governance, politics, and culture, 
Orbán is very outspoken about anti-globalism. This takes shape via his Euroscepticism, when he 




functioning as a symbol for global governance to Orbán (in the context of the May 2019 European 
Parliament Elections). He champions the Hungarian people by fighting for cultural independence 
and autonomy over legislation that would threaten their nationalistic ideologies.  
Liberal democracy: Not only does Orbán challenge the liberal democratic order within his 
narrative, he blatantly rejects the notion of it. He proclaimed passionately in his speech,  
 
“In my view, a contribution to the results we have achieved so far has been made by our 
open declaration that the age of liberal democracy is at an end. Liberal democracy is no 
longer able to protect people’s dignity, provide freedom, guarantee physical security or 
maintain Christian culture […]. Our response to this changed world, the Hungarian 
people’s response, has been to replace the shipwreck of liberal democracy by building 21st-
century Christian democracy. This guarantees human dignity, freedom and security, 
protects equality between men and women and the traditional family model, suppresses 
anti-Semitism, defends our Christian culture and offers our nation the chance of survival 
and growth. We are Christian democrats, and we want Christian democracy. (2018)  
 
With such a direct call against liberal democracy, this piece of the narrative is a perfect example 
of why the criterion for the challenges of liberal democracy was included in the working definition 
of populism. Additionally, this aspect matches up well because of Orbán’s experience in power 
for such a long time. He is a populist leader who has already changed the establishment within 
Hungary and has thus been on a path that has led to democratic backsliding for years, while other 
populists in Europe not in a head-of-state position have not been in a position to do so. While 
Orbán is insistent on his ideal form of democracy, a Christian democracy, there is a sense of tension 
in these words. This is an example of a sort of “say versus do” of the populist politician. Though 
in the excerpt given here, Orbán vows to protect the equality of men and women, for example, 




and progressing much slower than the EU average toward gender equality (European Institute for 





















CHAPTER 4: POPULIST NARRATIVES IN CONTEXT 
4.1: POPULISM WITHIN EUROPE: ELECTIONS AND POPULAR OPINION 
 Within this narratological analysis, I have found myself saying “so what?” to these 
speeches and the populists. Among my case studies, I have individuals who have won their 
national elections, but also some who have lost these, and those that are still vying for a spot in 
the executive office. I argue that the narratives of these populists contain specific narrative 
strategies and highly intentional verbiage that is made to resonate with a certain audience—an 
audience of the presumably “true people” of a country or region.  
 The goal of this section is just to pull away from the transatlantic perspective analysis 
briefly and focus just on Europe. In the twenty-first century, Europe, or more specifically, the 
EU has endured two separate crises – the financial crises that rocked the eurozone starting in 
2008 and the “refugee crises” that surged in 2015. Each crisis had major effects on several EU 
countries in particular, like Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain concerning the financial 
crisis and countries with external EU borders, like Greece and Italy as far as the refugee crisis is 
concerned. These countries may have received major setbacks, but all EU countries were 
impacted in some way or another with EU crisis management policies, such as a sharing of the 
financial burden and refugee distribution (Collett & Le Coz, 2018).  
 The rise of the populist right has lasted long enough that it is possible for us as 
researchers to analyze the effects it has had within and outside of EU countries. We say that 
words are powerful. How powerful are they? For the scale and scope of this research,  I thought 
it best to utilize data that has been collected by the European Union to bring the real perspective 
on the presence of a persistent message from the populist right in comparison to a country where 




European Union, we are able to see differences based on a number of variables. This is in 
particular clear if we direct our attention towards two countries that lend themselves to a “most 
different” approach for this comparison: Hungary, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, is a 
full-fledged right-wing populist country under the leadership of  populist strongman, Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán; and Ireland, with which with Taoiseach Leo Varadkar has kept political 
distance from the populist wave and has left researchers question if and when it will ever 
succumb.  
 The previous section contained a detailed breakdown of Viktor Orbán’s narrative and its 
relation to populism as a whole; however, in this section, I dig deeper into not just the narrative, 
also the discourse on migration in both countries. With this information, I will compare the 
general discourse and the way the migrant crisis is framed by the two country’s leaders, Orbán 
and Varadkar as well as the elections results from the election years following the migration 
crisis.  
Migration Discourse in Hungary 
Nationalist, right wing populism came to Hungary with its current leader, Viktor Orbán. 
In terms of populism’s definers, Orbán and his party, Fidesz, is the whole kit and caboodle in this 
country. So, just how did Orbán become the powerhouse of this populist wave? As many 
researchers will tell you, populists are strategic. They capitalize on societal frictions and crises 
and use the power of an emotional, and well-crafted narrative to wrangle the support of their 
people.  Orbán is leading the fight against multiculturalism within his own state and the EU as a 
whole, flanked by other post-Communist EU member states like Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia 
(a regional bloc known as the Visegrad Four). The concept of the populist “strongman” is central 




(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The passionate leader who vows to be the voice of the “true 
people” and represent them to the very end, protecting them from whatever, or more significantly 
in the context of this research, whoever, threatens their way of life. 
 Orbán himself, is the model of the modern-day populist leader, used as an example by 
many researchers of populist theory and is reported about by popular international media nearly 
every day for his controversial words and actions. Narratives are an exceptionally important tool 
for populists. The relationship between the populist leader and the people are integral for the 
success of a populist campaign. The speeches they give and the promises they make for their 
respective societies, are what propel them ever-forward as influential parties and voices that gain 
political legitimacy. Quickly, islamophobic rhetoric and words slandering multiculturalism 
flooded in from Viktor Orbán, who protested the proposed quota system of redistribution, citing 
Hungary’s history as a predominantly white, Christian nation (Orbán, 2019). Those words stuck, 
and support for the Prime Minister has remained steadfast.  
 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán gave a speech on the 170th anniversary of the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1848, and demonstrates (a somewhat tame, in this example) case of how he and 
his regime view immigration and the entry of non-Europeans (specifically, non-Christian, non-
white Europeans) into Hungarian borders.  
 
The situation, Dear Friends, is that there are those who want to take our country from us. 
Not with the stroke of a pen, has happened one hundred years ago at Trianon; now they 
want us to voluntarily hand our country over to others, over a period of a few decades. 
They want us to hand it over to foreigners coming from other continents, who do not speak 
our language, and who do not respect our culture, our laws or our way of life: people who 
want to replace what is ours with what is theirs. What they want is that henceforward it 
will increasingly not be we and our descendants who live here, but others. There is no 
exaggeration in what I have just said. Day by day we see the great European countries and 
nations losing their countries: little by little, from district to district and from city to city. 




surely they are consumed. External forces and international powers want to force all this 
upon us, with the help of their allies here in our country. And they see our upcoming 
election as a good opportunity for this (Orbán, 2018). 
 
 
Orbán has delivered blatantly unwelcoming messages like this to the citizens of Hungary, Europe, 
and the rest of the world. He uses strong words that paint the migrant as the enemy of the 
Hungarians, in a somewhat eloquent way in this official speech. However, he is not so withdrawn 
in statements made in more “informal” settings and interviews. In an article compiled by 
DeutscheWelle entitled “Viktor Orbán's most controversial migration comments”, for example, 
they cited his quote from an interview where he said,  
We don't see these people as Muslim refugees. We see them as Muslim invaders, Orbán 
said in a recent interview with German daily Bild newspaper. The 54-year-old prime 
minister of Hungary added: We believe that a large number of Muslims inevitably leads to 
parallel societies, because Christian and Muslim society will never unite. Multiculturalism, 
he said, is only an illusion. (Pearson, 2018) 
 
These crass statements so very obviously are heard by Hungarians, looking to their leader to 
“protect” them for those who “threaten” their society. One of the fundamental traits of populism 
is scapegoating and creating an enemy group to instill fear in a society, and Orbán has perfected 
this strategy so much so that he has been able to change not just minds, but policies on migration 
with these words (Goździak, 2019). 
Response from “the people” 
 But of course, the words of the Prime Minister do not truly speak to the overall discourse 
on immigration in Hungary, where actual citizens are concerned. Just to get an overall gist of how 
Hungarians feel, Eurobarometer provides great insight. Figure 2.0 shows the overall response from 
the 28 EU member states in June 2019 while Figure 3.0 isolates the Hungarian response.  When 
asked in 2019 if “Immigration of people from outside the EU evoked a positive or negative 




negative” feeling, totaling in 70% of Hungarians (who participated in the poll) with animosity 
toward non-EU immigrants (European Commission, 2019). A study analyzing Hungary’s federally 
sponsored public questionnaire titled “National Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism”, 
concluded that “an overwhelming majority of respondents supported the government’s position”, 
that “Hungarians do not want illegal immigrants and do not want to take part in the intellectual 
amuck of the European Left” (Bocskor, 2018). 
Figure 2. European Commission Public Opinion Poll (EU-28) 
“Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative 






Figure 3. European Commission Public Opinion Poll (Hungary) 
“Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative 
feeling for you: Immigration of people from outside of the EU (06/2019)” (European 
Commission, 2019) 
 
Migration Discourse in Ireland 
Taoiseach Leo Varadkar is not regarded as a populist. He was elected leader of Fine Gael 
(Family of the Irish), a liberal conservatist/ Christian democratic party, in June of 2017 (Murray, 
2017), as Europe was still in the midst of handling the settlement and resettlement of the millions 
of asylum seekers within EU borders. In comparison with some other leaders in the EU, 
Varadkar does not get the same kind of spotlight that others like Orbán do. Ireland has been 
brought back into the spotlight, however, with the Irish question being a problem for Brexit, but 
in terms of its dealings with the EU, Ireland tends to conform to the EU position rather than 
battle it (Murphy & O’Brennan, 2019), therefore making their relationship generally drama-free, 
outside of the financial crisis.  
 Not only is Ireland’s leader not a right-wing nationalist populist, but there is not a 




politics (Killoran, 2018). Islamophobic rhetoric, anti-immigration sentiments and words 
condemning multi-culturalism are not heard on the national level like that of Hungary. When 
Ireland’s leadership does speak out on immigration into Ireland, the words paint a different story. 
In an address to the Immigrant Council of Ireland Conference in 2019, Varadkar said,  
The message we need to articulate – is that migration is a good thing for Ireland and 
enriches our society. We all benefit from diversity and together we will be stronger for it. 
Migration makes our economy stronger, our public services sustainable and our culture and 
society richer. […] Diversity in Ireland is a reality and it is one of our greatest strengths. 
It is a strength that we are now one of the most diverse countries in the EU, with 17% of 
the population born outside Ireland. It is a strength that our workforce is the third most 
international in Europe. It is a strength that we are a place where people want to live and 
work. 
I share your vision of a society that respects human rights and diversity, and believes that 
everyone, including people from a migrant background, should have the opportunity to 
fulfil their potential (Varadkar, 2019). 
 
This message of inclusion rather than exclusion and fearmongering is therefore the message 
Varadkar is sending to his state and nation of Irishmen and its immigrants. Instead of vilifying the 
immigrants entering Ireland as a burden that will disrupt the unity of the Irish nation, he 
acknowledges the multifaceted benefits a multicultural society can have.  
Response from “the people” 
 An important note from this excerpt as well, is Varadkar’s mention of the 17% non-Irish 
population of Ireland. One in about every six persons, then, is a non-native of the country. With 
diversity already part of Irish society, the rhetoric surrounding immigration and multiculturalism 
is inherently different from that of Hungary. Migrant discourse that encourages tolerance is a 
sentiment held by not just the Prime Minster, but a majority of the Irish public as well, as shown 
in Figure 4.0. A Eurobarometer survey taken in June of 2019, for example, shows that 72% of 
Irish have a “positive” (either fairly or very) take on “Immigration of people from outside the 




in the positive migrant discourse in Ireland. According to the chief executive officer of the 
Immigrant Council of Ireland, there is a faction of the Irish society that utilize “language of fear 
to create the impression that people who were not born in [Ireland] are a threat to [their] way of 
life” (Killoran, 2018).  
In a world where we can connect across oceans and continents in a matter of seconds, it 
would be naïve and reductionist to simply say that the anti-immigration sentiments that thrive 
elsewhere have not made their way to Ireland. However, the difference is that they are not 
thriving or picking up traction in Ireland. Right-wing populism, as it exists is Hungary through  
 
Figure 4. European Commission Public Opinion Poll (Ireland) 
“Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative 






Viktor Orbán, for example, is not seen there. Instead, scholars theorize that, if this is indeed 
possible, a different type of populism exists in Ireland (Suiter, 2017).   
Hungary versus Ireland: Status of Democracy & National Election Results 
Another difference in the comparison of Hungary and Ireland is clear if we look toward 
the state of their democracies. Democratic backsliding and the rise of increasingly illiberal 
democratic regimes is a component of contemporary (right-wing) populism that has become of 
particular concern for populist scholars. If we look at election results data from both countries, 
we see considerable differences. 
In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s party, Fidesz, has maintained a strong grip on 
the Hungarian political system. From the 2014 national election to the 2018 election, Fidesz 
increased their electorate by 4.4% – this is not a lot, however, it got them to nearly 50% (49.3%) 
of the population’s vote in 2018. The runner-up party, Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP), 
only received 20% of the vote (Parties and Election in Europe, 2019). While Hungary still has 
elections, the democratic nature of them is highly questionable. Along with their populist 
reputation, they are also an example of democratic backsliding in Europe (Sedelmeir, 2017). 
According to Freedom House, Hungary’s democratic status has experienced “one of the most 
dramatic declines ever charted by Freedom House within the European Union” (Freedom House, 
2019), due to the abuse of his “party’s supermajority to impose restrictions on or assert control 
over the opposition, the media, religious groups, academia, NGOs, the courts, asylum seekers, 
and the private sector since 2010” (2019). Nationalist right-wing populism is surviving and 
thriving in Hungary, along with its narratives, right now because Hungarians really have not had 




Orbán has made it nearly impossible for any non-populist opposition to arise, therefore, 
attributing and furthering the democratic decline and increase of hostilities in Hungary. 
Ireland, on the other hand, offers a different picture. While the Freedom House data 
shows that many of the world’s democracies are in decline Ireland has actually managed to 
increase their levels of free-ness since the last measure in 2018 (Freedom House, 2019). On the 
Freedom House scale of freedom, Ireland is marked as “free” and is ranked as the 10th most-free 
country in the world whereas Hungary is only “partly free” and ranked toward the middle-bottom 
of the list of European countries for democratic rankings (2019). In terms of national elections, 
Ireland experienced more variance. From 2011 to 2016, the majority party, Fine Gael, actually 
lost a little over 10% of their votes and Sinn Féin increased their presence by about 4% (Parties 
and Elections in Europe, 2019). This data is more significant in assessing the influence of 
populism on the Irish because unlike Hungary  whose democratic outcomes in elections should 
not be taken at face value given the severe democratic backsliding taking place within the 
country, we know the Irish people are actually given a say in the elections within their liberal 
democratic order. The autonomy of the citizen is particularly important in the scholarship on 
populism because we gain insight into the actual effect of the populist message, or narrative, on 
“the people”. In Ireland’s case, though we see a marginal increase in support for the “populist” 
party, Sinn Fein, from these election results, we ultimately can deduce that populism truly has 
not made sweeping political upsets, even in times of economic and social distress and full-on 







“Populism” in Ireland? 
Given this information on Ireland regarding the population’s reactions and generally positive 
sentiments on immigration in what is such a largely contested issue within the EU now, the 
question is, why is Ireland an outlier? The Republic should be the ideal breeding grounds for 
discontented, populist-minded politicians, given their contentious history and their experience 
with the 2008 financial crisis (Murphy & O’Brennan, 2019). European populists tend to fulfill 
the “anti-establishment”/ “anti-elitist” via Euroscepticism and general distrust of the European 
Union’s politicians in Brussels. Ireland has had an interesting relationship with the EU since its 
accession in 1973. It has often been regarded as an exemplary model for smaller member states 
and the opinion of the EU in Ireland was generally positive due to the success of the Irish 
economy once it entered the Eurozone (Murphy & O’Brennan, 2019). The 2008 crisis, however 
put into question the good graces the Irish kept the EU under. The crisis hit Ireland hard – 
resulting in a €40 billion bill owed to the European Central Bank by November 2008 and a 
14.7% unemployment rate by 2011 (Murphy & O’Brennan, 2019). What followed for Ireland in 
terms of austerity plans from 2008 from the EU was nothing short of a headache for the Irish 
government and the Irish people, with heavy criticism of the actions of the Irish government and 
the EU’s help, or lack thereof, in getting Ireland’s economy back in shape. 
During this tumultuous time in Ireland, the national elections that took place in 2011 made 
way for the coming to power of Fine Gael, the opposition party to Fianna Fáil. According to 
scholars, other political fractioning did occur, but by and large, it did not shake the political 
system all that much (2019). According to populist research for Ireland, Sinn Féin has emerged 
as the party that brought the Eurosceptic, populist narrative to the Republic after 2008 (Suiter, 




populist party; though in this case, instead of your standard run-of-the-mill right-wing nationalist 
group, Sinn Féin is instead, a left-wing party. But this is where understandings and definitions of 
populism get skewed. 
There is scholarship that suggests all types of theories for populism in Ireland ranging from 
“complete populism” to “empty populism” (Suiter, 2017). One of the lingering questions that has 
not been necessarily answered, though, is if populism can still be called “populism” without all 
of the components that have been attributed to it by the leading scholars in the field. Sinn Féin, 
for example, does not espouse the component of populism that demonizes immigrants, which, as 
seen, is a major component in the nationalist right-wing narrative. More than that, other 
scholarship suggests that another reason why other populist groups have not formed and been 
taken up in Ireland is because of the presence of Sinn Féin itself – leaving no room for another 













CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION 
5.1: ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION 
 To unpack the findings from my study, I will utilize the research questions I listed at the 
beginning of my project. Given the scope of this specific project, I will stick to keeping remarks 
contained to answering those question as well as reviewing the outcomes of the hypotheses. The 
case studies chosen for this project, are intended to represent the acknowledged populist leaders 
across Europe and the US today as well as a non-populist example that acts as a counter-case 
study. While the politicians themselves were carefully chosen, their narratives that were analyzed 
were chosen with some degree of randomness in terms of the content. I did not want to “cherry-
pick”, so to say, the speeches or interviews, because I did not want my influence of what I 
thought was a “good” or “bad” narrative content to have any effect on the findings. Thus, the 
narratives were, to a degree, randomized. Therefore, the content or topics included in every 
narrative did not necessarily match that of the others, requiring a bit of creativity to analyze the 
content with the criteria of the working definition. I also acknowledge that the extent of the 
topics covered in these narratives does not encompass the entirety of the politicians’ rhetoric and 
political, social, or economic viewpoints. When and if this project’s scale is increased, I would 
look to employ more narratives per case study, and/or pick fewer case studies with a greater 
amount of content. 
 In terms of the findings presented here, though, the use of an abridged narratology, or 
attempting to break down the speeches in a way that looks into the deeper meaning and strategy 
behind the words via the criteria system proved to show very interesting findings that we can 




themselves, but also to the transatlantic relationship. First, I set out to find the major themes of 
populism between the EU and the US  
European Populism 
 In choosing narratives from more or less the same timeframe for Le Pen, Orbán, and 
Wilders, I am not surprised that there were really just a few themes that dominated. Immigration, 
the protection of national values and national sovereignty, the condemnation and/or outright 
rejection of the European Union and its leaders were all common themes amongst them. In the 
US however, the issues were more diverse between left- and right-wing representatives of 
populism. The left-wing narrative from Sanders centered on the wealth inequality in the US, and 
on the corruption of the financial elite in the US The right-wing narrative from Trump, however, 
mostly included pointing out the corrupt elite and the “failures” of the political establishments 
prior to his. Interestingly, though, Sanders and Trump have been proven to share similar ideas 
regarding anti-globalism. 
 One of the shortcomings I find with this research design – and with this specific 
comparison – is the lack of mention of anything related to immigration from the US case studies. 
While simply not a component of these narratives presented here, the current US political 
landscape and major themes in Trump’s rhetoric are centered on immigration. In fact, that would 
be the theme that the right-wing populists of both Europe and the US have most in common 
today: the assertion of anti-immigration policies in order to protect national identities. The 
absence of this theme in the US narrative from the right and left in this study obviously does not 





 This notion feeds into several other questions I set out to answer within this research on 
the viability of a specific populist definition as well as the effectiveness of the narratological 
method as I have approached it. As a reminder, my first hypothesis is: 
H1: Using narratology to compare populist rhetoric will show how the guiding concepts of 
populism can manifest themselves in very different ways across the political spectrum, 
national borders, continents. 
From the findings delivered here, this assertion can be confirmed. For example, the definitions of 
each populist’s version of “the people” and “the elite” changed from person to person. Having 
their raw verbiage to dissect allowed me to dig deeper into their words and find who, with the 
contexts of the narrative, each populist molded the “us versus them” ideology to fit their distinct 
political platforms and ideologies. However, the success of this is contingent on prior 
background knowledge of who the politician is. Each isolated narrative from a politician that was 
chosen does not exist in isolation. For clarification, having a general knowledge of these 
politicians and their policies was extremely helpful in the narratological process. 
 This methodology of dissecting the narratives was not only clarifying what is said by 
these leaders, but also what is not said, and what content is instead chosen to be left out. I would 
like to exempt the case of Geert Wilders of the Netherlands. Although he is regarded as one of 
most prominent the right-wing populist leader of the Netherlands, he diverges from the path of 
the cookie-cutter nationalist populist in the area of social policies, framing him as a sort of left-
wing populists when we base our perspective on these policies. There is no doubt that Wilders 
fits the bill of a nationalist, Islamophobic, anti-immigration populist leader. But the comparison 
between a populist such as wilders and the Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán shows the fissures 
in our political definitions and sheds light on the basic national differences that influence the 




 This notion came about in discussion of the differences in social policy structures across 
Europe. One prime example lies in the legality of same-sex marriage. The Netherlands was the 
first country in the world to legalize marriage of same-sex couples back in 2001 (Government of 
the Netherlands, 2020), and this right, non-traditional but with Christian roots, has now been 
embedded within the infrastructure of Dutch identity for 19 years. In Hungary, however, 
homophobic attitudes have, to date, been on the rise and have been exacerbated by Prime 
Minister Orbán, who revised the Hungarian Constitution to say that marriage is strictly that 
union of a man and a woman (Arato, 2019). Therefore, in terms of the political spectrum within 
Europe, Wilders may be perceived as a more “progressive” populist through the lens of a 
politician who does not agree with those kinds of social policies, and it is interesting that both are 
by-and-large labeled as right-wing populists, when the spectrum is more blurred in the European 
context. This example is by no means meant to make excuses for one politician or another on 
their political stances when it comes to the treatment of minorities. This discussion is meant to 
clarify that (right-wing) populism is a loaded term that may ignore more nuanced understandings 
of the reality of political differences that make European countries, their politicians, and political 
systems quite different from one another.   
H2: Populism is still inherently, by nature paradoxical but there are constants that can be 
isolated from narratives that give it a loose binding. 
My second hypothesis pertains to the effectiveness of the working definition for populism 
that I used throughout my data collection. The criteria I used were a collection of commonly seen 
themes in populism, as detailed in recent scholarship. No scholar, though, offered a definition for 
explaining populism beyond the fundamental distinction between “the people” and “the elite”. I 
would still classify this as proven by the findings. All of the narratives within this study could be 




working definition. The concept of “challenging liberal democracy” for example, is something 
best analyzed through the actions of populists in power, such as Viktor Orbán. Tying this 
criterion of populism to Le Pen and Wilders, though, was harder to achieve because they have 
never held a national leadership position such as President or Prime Minister and I had to rely on 
hypothetical scenarios and the calls to action they themselves made in their speeches. However, 
their speeches on the topic of immigration specifically show that they are uninterested in a 
pluralistic society that focuses on giving and maintaining the rights of certain minorities – more 
specifically, in this case, Muslim immigrants who have been entering their countries at a high 
rates since the 2015 refugee crisis. 
 It is interesting to entertain the notion that challenging liberal democracy is part of the 
right-wing populist narrative, not necessarily exclusively, but predominantly, as liberal 
democracy is an ideology that is promoted by Sanders, the lead example for leftist- populism in 
this study, as well as by Leo Varadker (though not a populist at all in these terms). However, the 
lack of a truly defined left-wing populist narrative from Europe in this research limits me from 
making such a claim. In the future, I would look to add a narrative from more left-leaning 
populists, such as Emmanuel Macron of France, or from the Greek political party Syriza. Even if 
we look at Geert Wilders once more, in spite of the fac that he opposes a pluralistic society and 
the rights of minority immigrants within the Netherlands, he does defend the rights of certain 
minority groups, such as the LGBTQ+ community who are able to maintain certain rights that 
are simply unavailable in other countries where right-wing populism rules. Populism is an 
inherently paradoxical, contradictory, and yet also nuanced phenomenon, making populism as a 




The same goes for populism in the context of the United States and its “populist” 
politicians. In the case studies I chose for this project, Bernie Sanders is the only self-identifying 
left-wing populist. With the flood of right-wing populists today, it is hard to see past the ties of 
populism to nationalism, and the two terms are sometimes mistakenly used interchangeably 
because of their close association. But in such examples as Bernie Sanders, we must remember 
that populism itself is not an ideology; it is a political modality that is linked to other ideologies. 
For many in Europe and for Donald Trump in the US, that does happen to be right-wing 
nationalism. But, for Sanders, the ideology he is interested in is democratic socialism (Judt, 
2016).  
The model that we have for populists does not entirely fit the message that Sanders is 
conveying in his speeches. Sanders checks off several categories in the working definition that 
largely mirror the sentiments of the Occupy Wall Street movement. In the United States, there is 
no supranational establishment like that of the European Union to criticize, but, only the national 
government itself or, for Sanders, big business and the “1%” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). “The 
people” according to Sanders’s narrative are ultimately the working class, framed as “the 99%” 
(2017). The heavy hitters in defining what “makes” a populist are present in Sanders’s speech; 
however, his embedded rhetoric stemming from the Occupy Movement is what is steering him 
away from us bring able to consider him a full-fledge populist. While Sanders and Trump are 
intertwined within the conversation for left and right-wing populism in the US and are the 
default politicians, a leading populist scholar in the 21st century, Cas Mudde, in a 2016 interview 
went on record to say “I believe neither Trump nor Sanders is a populist” because Trump really 
only speaks for himself, rather than the people, and Sanders does not have a “normative 




work on populism in the slightest, it is, however, meant to shed light on the ways in which 
academia is using the term populist, and if the way we understand it stands true to what 
politicians are actually saying and doing. Thereby, this research shows that if we understand 
populism as something that is paradoxical and ever-changing to a nation’s sensitivities, an 
argument could be made that Sanders is indeed a populist in the frame of the United States, just 
as Geert Wilders is a right-wing populist in the Netherlands, but perhaps seen as more left-
leaning in places like Hungary.  
And finally, there are other constants that could have been added, or perhaps been taken 
away from the working definition. One example would be the addition of “the populist leader” 
and analyzing what type of leader (i.e., the entrepreneur, the strongman/woman, the ethnic 
leader, as Mudde & Kaltwasser define them) each populist is – and seeing if that is a defining 
trait of populism today. Populism adapts to society and its sensitivities to the world around it. 
The constants given in this research to test the populist narratives may pertain to populism today, 
but perhaps populism will change in the future, as it has up until this point in history.  
H3: The themes within contemporary populism are able to transcend borders and domestic 
politics, thus being influential in political culture of both the United States and Europe. 
Taking into consideration the considerable congruence among the themes of European 
populists’ narratives, I would argue that trends in populism spread quickly across borders and 
over oceans nowadays. The usage of media and technology to communicate these ideas is so 
intense that it is nearly impossible to not be exposed to the politics of another political party, 
another politician or of another nation today. Populism in the past used to be short-lived and not 
very successful in terms of winning elections. Today though, populist leaders and parties have 
stuck around for many years and are continuously, slowly but still steadily, gaining influence 




even the leadership of a country in its entirety, as we have seen with the election of Donald 
Trump and the successive reelections of Viktor Orbán. And if we think about the transatlantic 
relationship between the EU and the US today, both have enormous influence on their mutual 
economies and cultures. With this analysis, it seems as though there is now a new type of 
political influence that spreads via populism between the EU and the US that has not existed 
before.     
Through the lens of this narratological approach, we are able to see a bit deeper into the 
nuances of contemporary populism in the United States and Europe. Though populism has 
existed in both regions for over a century, their paths never truly converged until the twenty-first 
century. By comparing the narratives of prominent US and European populist leaders today, we 
now have a better understanding of the contents and themes of the contemporary populist 
leaders’ narratives. When we look at populism from a transatlantic perspective, however, it we 
should mention the attempts at aligning the US and European populist movements by Steve 
Bannon in recent years.  
 In an effort to create some sort of global infrastructure for populism, former advisor to 
Donald Trump, Steve Bannon, created what he called “The Movement” in 2017 (Nossiter & 
Horowitz, 2019). This Brussels-based movement has been described as a “club” of sorts for 
European populist parties and politicians to unite and strategize ways of making sweeping gains 
in the 2019 European Parliaments elections (De La Baume & Borelli, 2019). Members and 
potential members of this group have included notable populist leaders and political figures such 
as Nigel Farage, former leader of the United Kingdom’s Brexit Party, Matteo Salvini of Italy’s 
party Lega/Lega Nord, as well as the son of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro (Jacobs, 2020; De 




how this scheme has played out for Bannon over the past few years. Not well. European 
populists like Marine Le Pen are keeping Bannon and “The Movement” at arms-length or turning 
away from him completely, saying that they “don’t need him” (Nossiter & Horowitz, 2019).   
 Bannon’s attempts to bring power to Eurosceptics and unify the European populist front 
was unsuccessful. The populists he tried to appeal to were not sold on allowing an American 
puppeteer in European affairs and were not interested in the brand of populism he was trying to 
sell (2019). What Bannon failed to understand is something that is well known across the 
different populist parties of Europe: while they share certain views on current topics such as 
immigration and the actions of the European Union, they ultimately have different goals and 
motivations that makes them believe a united front of populists would not be helpful to them 
(Serhan, 2019; De La Baume & Borelli, 2019). 
 While the Transatlantic relationship has been bolstered over the years through economic 
and stronger ideological ties, the relationship between European and American populism overall 
is simply not something that is or is even in the process of becoming well-developed. Through 
the narrative approach used to dissect US and European populist speeches show overarching and 
connecting themes, the attempts at bringing the US’s version of populism (through Bannon 
himself) into Europe have fallen flat.  
H4: The influence of populists and the populist narrative are highly contextual and based 
on a country’s political sensitivities. 
 The basis this research offers to address this hypothesis comes from the section 
comparing a populist-led country, Hungary, with a country that has not been experiencing the 




Eurobarometer, and also track national election outcomes in the years following the European 
migration crisis, when political narratives regarding migration were at an all-time high, it is clear 
that there is an impact of a leading populist politician’s words and framing of national crises on a 
voting population.  
 While analyzing these data in relation to two countries in particular, though, there are 
several variables that need to be considered before solidifying any conclusions on the 
quantifiable influence of the populist narrative. One variable isolated here was the amount of 
freedom a country had and the status of its democracy. One plausible reason, given the success of 
Viktor Orbán and his party, Fidesz, are the measures he has taken to scale back liberal 
democratic freedoms, making his country considerably “less free” even in recent years.  
 The term “free” itself is a loaded term, which I hope to clarify a bit with examples. There 
is a difference between these two countries, for example, in who controls the media within the 
state: is it privately or nationally owned? The analysis throughout this research has relied heavily 
on the influence of words and how politicians can manipulate voters. It is important to think 
about what kind of messages the general public receives through news media on a daily basis, 
who is delivering the message, and what their motives are in framing a story. For the sake of 
continuity in data acquisition, using Freedom House to look at media freedom can help give a 
basic understanding of this concept. While the Hungarian constitution does protect freedom of 
the press, Orbán had created loopholes to make it so that the media is Hungary is exceptionally 
pro-government and working to amplify the message from the Prime Minster. Because of this, 
the spread of Orbán’s “xenophobic rhetoric hamper[s] voters’ ability to make informed choices” 
(Freedom House, 2020). Ireland, however, is reported by Freedom House to have free and 




an election, for example, are made without the kind of manipulation constricting democracy that 
is happening in Hungary (Freedom House, 2020). 
 The framing of the migrant crisis has been particularly important in this analysis as well, 
making the contextualization of the migrant crises very different between Hungary and Ireland. 
The speech used from the Taoiseach shows that he and the Irish majority have framed the crisis 
as a human rights issue, whereas the Hungarian Prime Minister has framed it as a national 
security issue that threatens the Hungarian way of like of the “real people”. While there are more 
variables that could have been utilized in this analysis to form a more nuanced understanding of 
the differences in reactions to the migrant crisis, the research I have provided shows a clear 
message of how important contextualization is for the presence and influence of populism.  
5.2: CONCLUSION 
The arrival of populism in the twenty- first century is a phenomenon that cannot be 
ignored. Looking at the European Union and the United States, the past 20 years alone have 
created fertile ground for populist movements to take root and grow out of the fear and 
discontent from the global economic crisis of 2008 and the migrant crisis that peaked in 2015. 
The goal of this research was to take a deeper look into not only who the populists in Europe and 
the US are today, but to look into why they have been called populists by scholarship and news 
media and try to gain an understanding of how populism manifested itself within these regions 
independently and in relation to with one another through narratives. 
While there are many avenues this research could have taken, the use of narratology and 
the dissection of a populist’s narrative is an approach that is unique to my contribution to this 




comparing populists with one another in terms of the speeches and the messages they deliver 
proved to be helpful for my research. This method showed that populism itself is not an 
ideology, but instead a political mode that attaches itself to the ideology of a populist politician. 
It is a way of playing politics strategically to use the political sensitivities of a nation, a region, or 
globally, to create the idea of “the true people” against “the establishment”/”the elite”, or the 
triadic idea of “the people” versus “the elite” versus “the outsider”. This is why populism is able 
to take hold on both the right and the left of the political spectrum. Although, as is seen 
nowadays, right-wing populism fueled by nationalist ideologies has been more successful than 
left-wing populism. 
I wish to acknowledge the shortcomings of this research and its methodology. In 
embarking on this journey with populism, all of the different avenues of potential methodologies 
for this research became apparent. If this project were to expand, for example, I would move to 
include more narrative examples for each case study in the form of official speeches, as well as 
analyze their presence on social media and how they utilize platforms such as Twitter to amplify 
their messages. Additionally, the scope of this research limited the number of case studies for 
analysis as well as the level of governance. This study, for example, looked at populists who 
were popular, national level political actors (along with their parties). A notable drawback of this 
approach is the absence of other populist politicians and parties that have been on the rise over 
the past several years alone, such as Germany’s right-wing populist party, Alternative für 
Deutschland, and Thierry Baudet and his Forum for Democracy party from the Netherlands. I 
believe the addition of a multi-level governance approach will work to strengthen the arguments 




While historically, populism has been a relatively short-lived phenomenon, I argue that 
the type of populism that is present today is different, since it has remained a part of the political 
cultures within the US and the EU for over a decade now. Populism cannot mobilize without a 
supply for it to, and the two, now three international crises (including the 2020 COVID-19 
pandemic) in the twenty-first century have created quite a bit of discontent and many political 
frictions that explain populism’s continued relevance in politics. This research has revealed that 
while populism can be given perhaps a skeleton definition, its manifestation and the ways it can 
behave vary largely when we bring in each country’s political sensitivities. As research in this 
discipline continues to proliferate, I look forward to using this analysis to better understand what 
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